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 Eurosystem debts, Greece, and the role of banknotes 
 
 The public debt of Greece to foreign governments, including debt to the 
EU/IMF loan facility and debt through the eurosystem, rose from €47.8bn to 
€180.5bn between January 2010 and September 2011. €17.1bn of the rise in 
eurosystem debt was due to an 86% increase in the Greek issue of euro 
banknotes. 
 
 If EU/IMF loans to Greece cease, they will be replaced by larger Greek 
borrowing from the eurosystem, for as long as Greece stays in the euro. 
 
 Eurozone governments would only escape from lending to Greece if access of 
the Bank of Greece to eurosystem credit were restricted. But this would 
impede the clearance of payments out of Greece, it would imply that cross-
border payments by means of euro banknotes would also have to be restricted, 
and it would force Greece out of the euro.  
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The operation of the eurosystem 
An essential property of monetary union is that 
euro banknotes exchange one-for-one irrespective 
of their country of issue. Since notes are issued by 
all national central banks (NCBs) in the euro area, 
this means that each NCB must accept notes 
issued by all others, at par. 
This gives rise to a second essential property: a 
euro bank deposit in one country has the same 
value as in any other country. To uphold this 
property, all NCBs must accept claims on all others 
that arise from cross-border financial flows.1  
Cross-border flows that give rise to intra-
eurosystem claims may be redemptions of 
government or private securities. They may also be 
payments for imported goods and services or 
‘capital flight’; that is, transfers of deposit balances 
from one euro country to another that are 
unrelated to trade. 
Suppose a deposit is moved from a Greek bank to 
a German bank, but the German bank refuses to 
accept payment in the form of a claim on the 
Greek bank, either directly or via another 
interbank counterparty. The debt is then settled 
via their central banks: the Greek bank makes up 
for its lost deposit by borrowing more from its NCB 
(the Bank of Greece, BoG); the German bank 
reduces its borrowing from the Bundesbank 
(German NCB); and the Bundesbank acquires a 
claim on the BoG.2  
These claims between the NCBs are aggregated by 
the EU settlement system known as TARGET2 and 
                                                 
1 In a fixed exchange rate regime between two currencies, 
the fixed rate is maintained by the commitment of one or 
both central banks to exchange the currencies at that rate 
in unlimited amounts. Countries that have adopted the 
euro have abandoned the separate identities of their 
currencies but the same principle applies. 
2 Sinn (2011) argues that Bundesbank lending to other 
countries via the eurosystem crowds out domestic lending 
by its own banks. However, as explained by Whelan (2011) 
and others, there is no such connection between the 
Bundesbank’s lending to foreign NCBs and its lending to 
German banks. 
are considered as a net claim or liability of each 
NCB against the European Central Bank (ECB).  In 
other words, a creditor NCB such as the 
Bundesbank has a claim on the ECB while the BoG 
has a debt to the ECB.3 
 
Accounting for cross-border banknote flows 
The other way to make payments between 
eurozone countries is by drawing euro banknotes 
in one country and depositing them in another. 
This also gives rise to intra-eurosystem claims and 
there needs to be a mechanism for clearing such 
payments through the respective NCBs. 
Moreover, every unit of currency drawn from a 
central bank is effectively an interest-free loan to 
the central bank, against which it holds interest-
bearing assets. In countries with their own 
sovereign currency, the seigniorage income thus 
derived accrues to the state. However, in the 
eurozone, euro banknotes are issued by all 17 
NCBs, so the seigniorage has to be distributed 
amongst them. 4 
If euro banknotes carried a mark identifying the 
NCB that issued them, these ends could be 
achieved by repatriation: when a note issued by 
one NCB is deposited with another, the receiving 
NCB could send the note back to the issuing NCB 
for credit. But this is not possible as the banknotes 
issued by NCBs are indistinguishable.5  Thus, the 
                                                 
3 See ECB Annual Report, 2010, page 219. Discussions of 
the transactions of the NCBs though TARGET2 can be 
found in Garber (2010), Whittaker (2011), Boone and 
Johnson (2011) and the Bundesbank Monthly Report, 
March 2011, pages 34-35. 
4 Disregarding coin (i.e. treating currency solely as 
banknotes) and disregarding the costs of production and 
distribution of banknotes, the eurozone seigniorage 
income during 2010 was €8.2bn, calculated as the cost of 
borrowing the outstanding banknote issue from NCBs at 
the main refinancing rate (1% during 2010). 
5 The serial code on each euro banknote contains a country 
letter:  X refers to Germany and T to Ireland, for instance. 
However, this identifies the NCB that commissioned the 
printing of the notes, which may or may not be the NCB 
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method used in the eurosystem to distribute 
seigniorage and to account for cross-border 
banknote flows is to allocate each NCB a share of 
the total euro banknote issue outstanding at any 
time, weighted according to the country’s 
population and GDP.6 On an NCB balance sheet, 
the liability ‘banknotes in circulation’ shows this 
allocated value; it is not the value of banknotes 
issued by that NCB.  
However, the net outstanding value of banknotes 
issued by an NCB has to be recorded as a liability in 
its balance sheet. An NCB that has issued more 
notes than its allocation therefore has a further 
entry on its balance sheet: ‘liabilities related to the 
allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem (net)’. When added to the NCB’s 
allocation (the liability labelled ‘banknotes in 
circulation’), this adjustment makes up the total 
banknote issue of that NCB, and it owes the 
amount of the adjustment to other NCBs. 
Conversely, where an NCB has issued fewer 
banknotes than its allocation, the difference is 
entered as an asset: ‘claims related to the 
allocation of euro banknotes’.7 
This banknote adjustment for each NCB is a claim 
on, or a liability to, other NCBs in the same respect 
as TARGET2 claims. Intra-eurosystem debts arising 
both from TARGET2 transactions and banknote 
movements bear interest at the main refinancing 
rate set by the ECB, currently 1.25%.  
                                                 
 
that issued them. This is because notes are distributed 
around the NCBs between printing and issue; also an NCB 
may reissue notes previously issued by other NCBs that it 
has redeemed. Notes drawn from a bank in a particular 
country may thus have any letter. 
6 The weight of each NCB’s ‘banknote allocation key’ is the 
same as its ‘capital key’ (which sets the NCB’s contribution 
to the capital of the ECB) multiplied by 92%, the remaining 
8% being allocated to the ECB. For example, the 
Bundesbank has a capital key of 27.06% of the eurozone 
(January 2011) and a banknote allocation key of 24.90%. 
7 These procedures are set out in ‘Decision of the European 
Central Bank on the issue of euro banknotes’ 
(ECB/2010/29); Official Journal of the European Union L35, 
9 February 2011, page 26, and are discussed in Jobst 
(2011). 
Magnitudes of NCB banknote issues and 
eurosystem debts 
The values of banknotes issued by eurozone NCBs 
at June 2011 are shown in Table 1, together with 
the adjustments described above. 
There are two notable features of these data. First, 
the actual issues of notes by some NCBs differ 
substantially from their allocations, giving rise to 
large adjustments, i.e. intra-eurosystem claims.  
Second, the total banknote issue in the eurozone 
as a proportion of GDP is markedly larger than in 
the US or the UK, despite the use of US dollar 
notes outside the US. A likely cause of this large 
Table 1. Banknotes issued by central banks 
        June 2011         € billions   
   issued % of GDP allocated adjustment 
  Austria -6.8 -2.3 21.6 28.4 
  Belgium 9.6 2.6 27.0 17.4 
  Cyprus 1.1 6.1 1.5 0.4 
  Estonia 0.4 2.4 2.1 1.7 
  Finland 10.8 5.7 13.9 3.1 
  France 83.9 4.2 158.3 74.4 
  Germany 374.0 14.5 210.9 -163.1 
  Greece 36.6 16.2 21.9 -14.8 
  Ireland 27.1 17.4 12.2 -14.9 
  Italy 140.9 8.9 139.2 -1.7 
  Luxembourg 69.4 158.4 1.9 -67.4 
  Malta 0.8 12.7 0.7 -0.1 
  Netherlands 19.9 3.3 44.8 24.9 
  Portugal -0.3 -0.2 19.5 19.8 
  Slovakia 6.6 9.4 7.9 1.4 
  Slovenia 1.4 3.7 3.7 2.3 
  Spain 73.1 6.8 93.4 20.4 
  ECB 0.0  67.8 67.8 
  
total 
eurozone 848.5 9.0 848.5 ------ 
  US  $bn 985.8 6.7    
  UK £bn 53.9 3.7    
  
Negative adjustments indicate issues in excess of 
allocation. For instance, the central bank of Ireland has 
issued €14.9bn more banknotes than its allocation; it 
therefore owes this amount to other central banks. 
  
source: NCB financial statements and IMF 
International Financial Statistics   
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demand for euro notes is the presence of high 
value notes. Of the total euro banknote issue, 57% 
is in €100, €200 and €500 notes (December 2010), 
whereas it is the smaller denominations that are 
commonly used as a medium of exchange. 
Table 2 shows aggregated intra-eurosystem 
debts.8 The inclusion of debts arising from 
banknote flows makes a notable difference to the 
overall magnitudes of these debts, compared with 
the TARGET2 positions alone (as previously 
reported: Whittaker, 2011). 
As examples: as at June 2011, the German 
Bundesbank had issued €163.1 more banknotes 
than its share which, against its €336.5 TARGET2 
claim, brought its total eurosystem claim to 
                                                 
8 The only other intra-eurosystem debts on NCB balance 
sheets are claims on the ECB, mainly for foreign assets 
transferred to the ECB (a total of €40.2bn at December 
2010, allocated across NCBs according to their ‘capital 
keys’), which we disregard in this analysis. 
€173.5; the NCB of Luxembourg had issued far 
more notes (€69.4) than its share (€1.9bn) but the 
difference (€67.4bn) is offset almost exactly by its 
TARGET2 claim (€69.9bn). Around 98% of the 
Luxembourg note issue is in high value notes.  
Amongst the peripheral eurozone countries, note 
issues in Ireland and Greece are also higher than 
their allocations. This adds to their TARGET2 debts 
and may reflect hoarding or cash transfers out of 
these countries via the banknote route. As an 
opposite example, the banknote issue in Portugal 
is approximately zero. The bank attributes this to 
tourism, with visitors drawing notes in other 
eurozone countries and spending them in Portugal 
(Annual Report, 2010, page 280).  
With the exception of the rapid recent increase in 
the banknote issue by the BoG (by 86% between 
January 2010 and September 2011), these 
different issues by each NCB have generally built 
up gradually over the years since joining the euro 
currency. In contrast, the large TARGET2 debts 
have arisen mainly during 2007-2010. The 
TARGET2 debts of Ireland and Portugal have fallen 
slightly during 2011, presumably being displaced 
by loans to these countries from the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
Since June 2011, there have been marked 
increases in the TARGET2 debts of Spain and 
particularly Italy, which may reflect capital flight. 
By the end of September 2011, Spanish and Italian 
TARGET2 debts had risen by €38.8bn and €109.4bn 
respectively, raising total eurosystem debts of the 
peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy) to €460.3 (Chart 1a). 
Although these debts are accounted as lending by 
the ECB, the ECB itself is owned by the NCBs of 
eurozone states. Hence, irrespective of which 
NCBs are actually holding the corresponding 
claims, exposure to these debts falls on the 
remaining 12 (non-peripheral) countries, in 
proportion to their shares in the capital of the ECB 
(Chart 1b). It may be noted that, while Germany 
insists that its guarantee to the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) for supporting the 
Table 2. Intra-eurosystem claims 
          June 2011      € billions 
   TARGET2 
banknote 
adjustment        total 
  Austria -35.1 e 28.4 -6.7 
  Belgium -21.3  17.4 -3.9 
  Cyprus -6.4  0.4 -6.0 
  Estonia -0.2  1.7 1.5 
  Finland 6.0  3.1 9.1 
  France -18.3  74.4 56.1 
  Germany 336.5  -163.1 173.5 
  Greece -96.8  -14.8 -111.6 
  Ireland -129.5  -14.9 -144.4 
  Italy 6.0  -1.7 4.3 
  Luxembourg 69.9  -67.4 2.5 
  Malta -1.9  -0.1 -2.0 
  Netherlands 20.5  24.9 45.5 
  Portugal -57.3  19.8 -37.5 
  Slovakia -13.4  1.4 -12.1 
  Slovenia -2.0  2.3 0.4 
  Spain -45.4  20.4 -25.0 
  ECB -11.6 r 67.8 56.2 
  
Negative numbers indicate amounts owed 
to other central banks   
  e = estimate; r = residual     
  
source: NCB financial statements and IMF 
International Financial Statistics   
 4 
 
peripheral countries cannot exceed €211bn, its 
exposure to the same countries via the eurosystem 
(€196.6bn in September 2011 and unlimited) is in 
addition to this figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The public debt of Greece to other 
governments 
As set out above, net financial outflows from 
Greece cause a rise in BoG debts to the 
eurosystem. Besides private transfers, these 
outflows include the interest and principal 
repayments of the foreign debt of the Greek 
government. 
Suppose, for instance, that some Greek 
government debt matures and the government 
repays a foreign bondholder by drawing from its 
account at the BoG. When the payment is 
deposited into a foreign bank, that bank acquires a 
claim on its NCB which, in turn, acquires a 
(TARGET2) claim on the BoG. 9 
In other words, the repayment of a Greek 
government bond to a foreign creditor becomes 
an increase in the foreign debt of the BoG. But all 
profits and losses of NCBs accrue to their 
respective governments and their debts may thus 
be viewed as government debts. In this light, the 
repayment of a Greek government bond does not 
alter the magnitude of the foreign debt of the 
Greek government. It just shifts some of that debt 
so that the Greek government owes less to private 
foreign bondholders but more to foreign 
governments via the eurosystem. 
The opposite changes occur when the Greek 
government receives EU/IMF funds (‘bailout’ 
funds) under the loan facility agreed in May 2010, 
which it deposits into its accounts at the BoG or 
Greek commercial banks, causing a reduction in 
the eurosystem debt of the BoG. The receipt by 
the Greek government of a tranche of funds from 
the loan facility just means that some of its debts 
to other governments become direct rather than 
indirect through their respective central banks. 
It matters little whether foreign governments lend 
to Greece directly or through the eurosystem (i.e. 
the ECB), apart from the lower interest cost of 
eurosystem debt (currently 1.25%). Accumulated 
net financial outflows are therefore equal to the 
sum of debts under the loan facility and via the 
eurosystem (see Appendix).10 This is presented in 
Chart 2, which shows how eurosystem debt fell in 
the months in which tranches of loan money were 
                                                 
9 The outcome is the same if the Greek government pays 
by drawing from its account at a Greek commercial bank, 
causing that bank to borrow from the BoG (via refinancing 
or Emergency Liquidity Assistance). 
10 The total Greek public debt assumed by foreign 
governments also includes government bonds purchased 
by the ECB in the secondary market under the Securities 
Market Programme in May and June 2010. However, these 
purchases were at the initiative of the ECB, not caused by 
financial outflows from Greece. Moreover, they appear to 
have been mainly from non-Greek holders, thus having 
little effect on eurosystem borrowing. 
37.4
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115.5
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0 50 100 150 200
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Ireland
Chart 1a.  Eurosystem debts of the 
peripheral countries; September 2011.
€ billions
source: NCB financial statements
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received (May, September, December 2010; 
March, July 2011) while generally rising in 
between. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What if payments from the loan facility 
cease? 
Besides funding financial outflows, loans from the 
EU/IMF and/or the EFSF also help to finance the 
Greek government. But if these loans cease, there 
is another avenue by which the Greek government 
can continue to finance its deficits: it can resort to 
borrowing more from its commercial banks (a 
scenario discussed by Garber, 2010). Indeed, 
although the Greek government is unable to raise 
long-term funding on the bond markets, it 
increased its borrowing by means of short-term 
treasury bills by €22.8bn in the year to June 2011 
(Public debt bulletins, Greek Ministry of Finance). 
The Greek government is able to borrow from its 
banks because those banks can borrow from the 
BoG and, in turn, the BoG can borrow from the 
ECB so long as Greece remains in the euro. The 
banks themselves would be in no position to 
object to taking on more government debt, 
especially if their existing holdings of government 
debt are written down and this leads to larger 
state ownership. 
The ending of EU/IMF lending to Greece would 
therefore not be a binding constraint on its 
government budget or its foreign borrowing. 
Foreign outflows would just cause greater 
borrowing through the eurosystem as described 
above. It would be as if Greece had obtained 
‘bailout’ lending from the loan facility or EFSF after 
all. The same countries provide the loans or 
guarantees (apart from the non-eurozone 
contributions to the IMF component), with 
Germany bearing the largest share. There is no 
credible prospect that foreign outflows can be 
quickly reversed by sales of assets, by export 
surpluses or by attracting further foreign 
investment, even if ‘austerity’ achieves primary 
budget surpluses. Hence, if EU/IMF loans cease, as 
is repeatedly threatened, this will cause a faster 
rise in eurosystem debt. 
A restructuring of Greek government debt in 
private hands would be of little help in this 
respect, even if it is orderly and managed by 
agreement with creditors. If redemption payments 
to private foreign bondholders were eliminated for 
the next few years by extending maturities (as in 
the July 2011 proposal) this would bring a 
reduction in foreign outflows of the order of €12bn 
per year. The cancellation of coupons on all Greek 
government bonds in private foreign hands would 
save an additional €6bn per year. These are small 
numbers compared with the current rate of 
increase of Greek public debts to foreign 
governments (say, €50bn per year, Chart 2). 
Although the ECB would not condone an increase 
in backdoor funding of the Greek government via 
the eurosystem, there is little that it could do. It 
could make it hard for the BoG to refinance its 
banks, by ruling that Greek government debt is no 
longer eligible as collateral11. But then the BoG 
                                                 
11 Such a prohibition would presumably extend to assets 
that have gained eligibility by means of a Greek 
government guarantee. Making Greek government debt 
0
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Chart 2: Greek publicdebt to other governments
via the loan facility and the eurosystem.
source: Bank of Greece; European Commission
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could extend its use of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance which is not subject to ECB collateral 
rules. Although ELA is supposed to be for short 
periods, the Irish central bank has been using it for 
the past 2 years and is currently lending some 
€50bn to its banks via this route. The ECB Council 
could order the BoG to cease ELA, but this seems 
unlikely given the Irish precedent. 
If the ECB did prohibit ELA, depriving the BoG of 
any approved means of lending to its banks, the 
BoG would have no option other than to defy the 
ECB and continue to lend anyway, given the 
consequence of not doing do: the closure of its 
banks for the want of liquidity. 
The only way for the ECB to stop this indirect 
eurosystem lending to the Greek government 
would be by ordering other NCBs to refuse further 
credit to the BoG, shutting the BoG out of the 
TARGET2 system.12 But this would prevent 
clearance of cross-border payments out of Greece 
and amount to the expulsion of Greece from the 
euro. The free flow of credit between eurozone 
NCBs is an essential feature of monetary union. It 
is what keeps a euro in a Greek bank equal to a 
euro in banks elsewhere.  
As long as Greece remains in the euro, it cannot be 
excluded from eurosystem credit, so Germany and 
any other euro countries that still have sound 
finances will keep lending, whether or not the 
Greek government defaults. If this is not done via 
an official loan facility, it will go through the 
eurosystem (ECB), and it will increase if 
uncertainty about Greece remaining in the euro 
accelerates the flight of capital. 
The ECB has so far refused to back the EFSF and it 
is not comfortable with its purchases of peripheral 
government debt under the Securities Market 
                                                 
 
ineligible would also cause difficulties for other NCBs that 
are holding it as security for refinancing their banks. 
12 This scenario is considered by Boone and Johnson (2011) 
who make comparisons with the breakup of the post-USSR 
ruble zone. 
Programme. However, it cannot avoid continued 
lending to Greece or any other troubled country 
that remains in the euro. The ECB (or, more 
accurately, its owners, the NCBs that constitute 
the eurosystem) is the lender of last resort 
whether it likes it or not. If it were prepared to 
play this role more explicitly, this would do much 
to help confidence in peripheral sovereign debts. 
 
The role of banknotes 
With doubts about agreement on the latest Greek 
bailout-cum-austerity package, there is growing 
speculation that Greece may not stay in the euro. 
However, although a depreciating national 
currency would bring a temporary improvement in 
competitiveness, it is unlikely that Greece would 
find departure attractive.13 
Even if government debts could be simply 
rewritten into new drachmas, there would be 
serious disputes over which currency applies to 
international private contracts. Business would 
face higher retail lending rates as loans are 
converted from ‘hard’ euros to ‘soft’ drachmas and 
companies with debts in euros but earnings in 
drachmas would be in an impossible position. 
Amongst other difficulties, it is doubtful whether it 
would be possible to prevent large-scale capital 
flight.  
However, if Greece’s access to TARGET2 credit 
were cut, the decision would be taken out of its 
hands and it would be forced out of the euro. In 
particular, without TARGET2 credit, it would be 
inconsistent for the BoG to continue with 
unrestricted issue of euro banknotes which could 
still be used for making cross-border payments, 
allowing the BoG to continue running up 
eurosystem debts as described above. One is 
forced to envisage attempts by means of border 
                                                 
13 Detailed analyses of the problems for a country leaving 
the euro appear in Eichengreen (2010), Deo et al. (2011), 
and Buiter and Rabhari (2011). Lachman (2010) suggests 
that the political costs of continuing ‘austerity’ may be 
sufficient to induce Greece to take the initiative of leaving 
the euro. 
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controls to prevent banknotes leaving Greece until 
the BoG changed its issue in order to identify them 
as Greek (drachmas), or the rest of the eurozone 
countries changing the design of their euro notes 
in order to distinguish them from Greek euros.14 
If Greek-issued banknotes were distinguishable 
from the banknotes of other euro countries, it 
would be easier to argue that debts of Greek 
entities were measured in Greek euros. Then exit 
from the euro by suspending convertibility of 
Greek euros to euros of other countries would be 
less of an upheaval. But that was the point of 
                                                 
14 When the Czech Republic and Slovakia agreed to 
separate their currencies in 1993, limits were applied to 
banknote withdrawals, the carriage of banknotes across 
borders was restricted and existing banknotes were 
stamped to identify the country of issue until new national 
banknotes could be printed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
making them indistinguishable. Economic and 
Monetary Union was supposed to be permanent. 
Cementing all domestic claims into a foreign 
currency (the euro) was deliberate, enhancing the 
commitment of eurozone members but also 
adding greatly to the cost and uncertainty for 
them all when some member does finally leave. 
It is this, above all, that persuades Germany and 
others to keep lending, whether this is via EFSF 
loans, levered EFSF loans, ECB-backed loans, 
Eurobonds or the eurosystem. 
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Appendix:   Decomposition of Greek public debt to foreign governments 
 
Approximate magnitudes in € billions, June 2011 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greek public debt is defined here as the debt of the government and the Bank of Greece. 
 
 
The following identities hold: 
 
Increase in public debt to foreign governments 
 
 increase in borrowing from loan facility 
=  +   increase in eurosystem (ECB) debt 
  +   ECB purchases of government bonds (Securities Market Programme; SMP) 
   
  deficit on the current account of the balance of payments 
=  +   net private capital outflows 
  +   net redemptions of foreign held government debt (or sales to the ECB) 
 
For example, in a period in which there is no new borrowing from the loan facility and no ECB purchases of 
Greek government debt under the SMP, capital flight (net private capital outflows) causes an increase in 
borrowing of the Bank of Greece through the eurosystem (ECB). 
public  
debt 
460 
gov’t 
debt 
350 
bonds 
285 
loan facility 65 
Bank of Greece debt to 
eurosystem (ECB)  110 
private domestic 80 
private foreign 150 
SMP 55 
(ECB)  
public debt  
to foreign  
governments 
230 
total external 
debt of Greek 
public sector 
380 
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